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LEGISLATIVE ACTS OF 1922.
By J. G. BRuc.
Of the eight or ten so called "Big bills" enacted by the
1922 session of the General Assembly, but few have successfully
Withstood the test of the Court of Appeals. Several hard fought
measures failed by way of the veto axe and did not get even to the
courts. Principal among these was the carbon black bill, upon
which powerful lobbies exerted themselves, both for and against
it, the city government bill for Louisvile and the Thompson tax
bill.
The Bingham Co-operative Marketing Act' is the outstanding and probably the most important of the laws of 1922 which
have so far withstood all attacks upon its constfidtuionality. This
act has been upheld a number of times by many of the circuit
courts, but so far its constitutionality has not been brought in
question before the Court of Appeals. However, it is understood that some of those sued for breach of their contracts with
the Burley Tobacco Growers' Co-operative Association and who
have been held liable thereon by the circuit courts are preparing
to carry the attack before the Court of Appeals.
The purpose of the Bingham act, as stated in See. 1, is to
authorize the formation of non-profit, co-operative associations
with or without capital stock, for the purpose of encouraging
the orderly marketing of agricultural products through cooperation, to eliminate speculation and waste, to make the dis"tribution of agricultural products between producer and consumer as direct as can be efficiently done, and to stabilize the
marketing of agricultural products.
The Bingham act is in line with the movement which seems
to be spreading over the entire country, a movement toward the
co-operative marketing of farm products which is assuming
greater scope and greater economic importance from year to
year. The immediate cause was the situation in the tobacco
markets. The Kentucky bill is based very much upon the plan
2
of the fruit growers' associations of the Pacific coast
'Chapter 1, Acts of the General Assembly, 1922. (See also Chapter
109 as to foreign associations.)
2For a very able discussion of the Co-operative Marketing Associations, the reader is referred to the article of Mr. Gerard C. Henderson,
appearing In Vol. 23, Columbia Law Review (Feb., 1923).
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This law is of great interest to the lawyer in that many
Not only are the associations
new problems arise under it.
entering into business relations which require legal analysis and
advise, but the farmers, the buyers and the banking institutions
dealing with the associations will all be seeking the advice of the
lawyer.
The law increasing the powers of the Railroad Commission 3
also remains thus far as valid. It has especially to do with the
further regulation of common carriers and prescribes the duties
and powers of the Railroad Commission with reference thereto.
Bus and trunk lines running on public roads, as well as the
street railroad companies, are not included.
The Rash-Gullion Prohibition Act also still stands effec4
tive, although some thirty or more eases bringing it in question
have been before the Court of Appeals.5
The Normal School Act,0 providing for the establishment of
two Normal Schools for the training of white elementary teachers, is the subject of an attack before the .Court of Appeals at
this time. 'This Act created a State Normal School Commission,
consisting of eight members appointed as follows: Five by the
Speaker of the House of Representatives and three by the President of the Senate. This Commission is authorized and empowered to establish two normal schools, one to be located in
the western part of the State and the other to be located in the
eastern part of the State.
A great deal rivalry has sprung up between various towns
of these sections, each bidding for the location of one of the
schools in their locality, so that the question of their location
has now become almost a political one. The Court of Appeals
has refused to advance upon the docket the case attacking the
constitutionality of the law. As a consequence it will probably
not be heard until sometime during the next term of the court.
By that time the next legislature will have met and there is a
probability that some action will be taken towards settling the
question of the location of the schools.
Chapter 102, Acts of the General Assembly, 1922.
v. GoodZoe, 195 Ky. 240, 242 S. W. 632.
6 See also the note on the Court of Appeals and Prohibition, this
volume, page 215.
6Chapter 10, Acts of the General Assembly, 1922.
[Editorial Note:-This act has since been held constitutional by
the Court of Appeals in a decision rendered on May 15, 1923, by Judge
Clay. Judge Moorman dissenting.]
4Lake.

LISGsATIVE ACTS OF

1922

The load limit law7 for trucks is also the subject of review
before the Court of Appeals at the present time. This is an act
fixing the limits on loads moved over any turnpike, gravel or
other hard surfaced road in the State, between the 15th day of
December and the 1st day of April following. It especially affects the tobacco growers, who must haul their tobacco to market
during this period of the year. The purpose of the act is to
prevent the roads of the State from being cut up by the moving
over them of heavy trucks, during the winter months when they
are most easily torn to pieces. The act is being attacked upon
the ground that it is an unwarranted exercise of .the police
powers.
The Anti-Trading Stamp Act s was declared to be unconstitutional by the Court of Appeals on January 23, 1923, Judge
Clay delivering the opinion of the court.
This is an act to suppress and prohibit the issuance, distribution, gift, supply or procuring of trading stamps by any trading stamp company, persons, firms, corporation or. merchants,
and to prohibit the redemption of any trading stamps; to prohibit the advertisement of the issuance, distribution, gift, supplying op procurance of trading stamps; to prohibit the acceptance of any trading stamps by any person; and providing penalties for the violation of its provisions.
Four suits were brought for the purpose of testing the
validity of the act and were heard together and considered by
the court in one opinion: Lawton et al. v. Stewart Dry Goods
Company; Lawton, et at. v. United Cigar Stores Company of
America; Commonwealtlb v. United CigarStores Company; and
9
The act
.Ware, et al v. The Sperry & Hutchinson Company.
was challenged on the ground that it is not a valid exercise of the
police power, and that it is an invasion of the right of acquiring
and protecting property.
Commenting upon this, the court said: "Clearly the right
of acquiring property is not confined to cases of gift or inheritance, but carries *ith it as a necessary and inseparable incident
the right to engage in any business or occupation that is not injurious to th6 public weal. Therefore, when it is sought, as in

7Chapter

126, Acts of the General Assembly, 1922.
' Chapter 131, Acts of the General Assembly, 1922.
'197 Ky. 394.
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this case, not merely to regulate by reasonable restrictions, but
absolutely to prohibit, a particular business, the act cannot be
sustained, if, after the ingenuity of man has been strained to the
utmost, it appears that all reasons assigned for the exercise of
the power are merely fanciful, and such that if the doctrine be
carried to its logical extent, no business will be safe from legislative interference."
Among the reasons assigned for the support of the act were:
That the trading stamp or premium system encourages profligate
and wasteful buying and operates as a lure to improvidence; that
it introduces into business a middleman who receives a profit not
only from the stamps sold, but from those that are not redeemed,
and thereby adds to the cost of the article; that it offers opportunity for fraud in values and prices; that it gives opportunity
for coercion in that merchants are compelled to buy in order to
compete with their rivals; that it gives an advantage to large
concerns and thereby stifles competition; and that it is a system
of deceit in that it distracts attention from the quality and price
of the article bought, and from the fact that the discount stamp
is added to the cost of the article. The court thought these
reasons "merely fanciful" and not sufficient to sustain the act.
The main argument in support of the act was that the court
must presume that the legislature had -before it sufficient facts
to justify its action, and that something must be wrong with the
trading stamp or premium system because the legislatures of so
many states have enacted similar statutes. In reply to this, the
court said, "It is true every act of the legislature is presumed
to be valid, but the presumption is not conclusive."
In the case of Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 8 Sup. Ct.
273, 31 L. Ed. 205, Mr. Justice Harlan, commenting upon the
relations of the judicial and legislative departments of government with each dther, said: "It does not -atall follow that every
statute enacted ostensibly for the promotion of these ends, is to
be accepted as a legitimate exercise of the police powers of the
state. There are, of necessity, limits beyond which legislation
cannot rightfully go. If, therefore, a statute purporting to
have been enacted to protect the public health, the public morals,
or the public safety, has no real or substantial relation to those
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objects, or is a palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law, it is the duty of the courts to so adjudge, and thereby give effect to the Constitution.' 1
The General Registration Law" was declared unconstitutional by the Court of Appeals on June 28, 1922, Chief Justice
Hurt delivering the opinion and Judge Clay giving a dissenting
opinion.
This is an act providing for a system of registration of every
voter in the Commonwealth of Kentucky and prescribing and
naming the qualifications of voters in the State of Kentucky.
This case came up upon a motion for an interlocutory order
to direct the circuit court or judge to order an injunction to restrain the members of the election commission and the clerk of
the county court from putting into operation the provisions of
the registration law. The act was attacked on two grounds, one
dealing with the manner of its certification 2 and the other on
the ground that its requirements are contrary to section 6 of the
Oonstitution which provides that: "All elections shall be free
and equal." Two other sections of the Constitution must also
be considered in this connection. Section 145 prescribes the
qualifications of a voter to be a citizen of the United States of
the age of twenty-one years, who has resided in the state for one
year, in the county for six months, and in the precinct in which
he purposes to vote for sixty days preceding the election, subject
to certain specified exceptions. Section 147 provides that: "The
General Assembly shall provide by law for the registration of all
persons entitled to vote in cities and towns having a population
of five thousand or more; and may provide 'by general law for
" For a discussion of anti-trading stamp or premium legislation, see
State, ex reL Simpson v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 110 Minn. 378, 126
N. W. 120, 30 L. R. A. (N. S.) 966 (1910) (collecting cases), wherein
the court held: "1. The act is a constitutional exercise of the police
power, in so far as it prohibits the issuing of trading stamps or tickets
to be redeemed in articles of merchandise in any manner which depends
upon any chance, uncertainty, or contingency. 2. The issuing and redemption of trading stamps, as carried on by respondent company, is
not attended with such elements of chance, uncertainty, and contingency as to justify the restrictions imposed by the act. The enforcement of those conditions against the company would operate not as a
reasonable regulation of its business, but practically as an absolute
prohibition thereof." See also, District of Columbia v. Kraft, 35 App.
D. C. 253; Kanne v. Segerstrom Piano Co., 118 Minn. 483.
'
U Chapter 138, Acts of the General Assembly, 1922.
2See under case comments this volume, page 237.
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the registration of other voters in the state. Where registration is required, only persons registered shall have -the right to
vote. mode of registration shall be prescribed by the General
Assembly."
In commenting upon sections 145, 147 and 6, supra, the
court said that they "must be construed together and in so doing it is manifest that the legislature in enacting registration
laws, under section 147, supra, has not the power to enact such a
law as will add to the voter a qualification necessary to exercise
the right of suffrage in addition to the qualifications prescribed
by sections 145 and 147, supra, or will cut off the voter from the
ballot box without fault on his part, or prevent his vote from
being equal to that of any other citizen as guaranteed him by
section 6, supra.
The court cites Mr. Cooley in his work on Constitutional
Limitations where the rule is laid down to be: "All regulations of the elective franchise must be reasonable, uniform and
impartial, they must not have for their purpose, directly or indirectly, to deny or abridge the constitutional rights of citizens
to vote, or unnecessarily to impede its exercise. If so they must
be declared void."
The necessary nature of a registration law, the court said,
is to facilitate the exercise of the right of the ballot, and not to
defeat it.' "
It is interesting to note that the registration law was one
of the hard fought political measures of the 1922 session of the
General Assembly. The bill was vetoed by the Governor and
was passed by the two houses of the legislature over his veto.
The Simmons Road Bill 1 4 was declared unconstitutional by
the CMurt of Appeals on December 15, 1922, Judge Thomas delivering the opinion of the court and Judge Clay dissenting.
This is an act amending and re-enacting a former act"; relating to the Delartment of State Roads and Highways, and
creating in it a State Highway Commission consisting of four
members, the first of whom were named in the act, and providing that their successors shall be elected by the legislature; also
aCiting
Van Bokhe7n v. Canady, 73 N. C. 198.
" Appendix, page 459, Acts of the General Assembly, 1922.
"Chapter 17, Acts of the General Assembly, 1920.
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providing salaries for the positions. By the former act the
members were appointed by the Governor and there were no
salaries attached to the positions.
The main ground upon which the act was assailed was that
the legislature possessed no constitutional right to name in the
bill the first members of the commission, or to elect their successors thereafter. The provisions of sections 27 and 28 of the
Constitution are given in support of this contention. Section
27 says: "The powers of the government of the Commonwealth
of Kentucky shall be divided into three district departments,
and each of them be confined to a separate body of magistracy,
to-wit: Those which are legislative, to one; those which are executive, to another; and those which are judicial, to another."
Section 28 provides that: "No person, or collection of persons,
being one of those departments, shall exercise any power properly belonging to either of the others, except in the instances
hereinafter expressly directed or permitted."
The opinion of the court is a very lengthy one, commenting
upon the origin of our Constitution and the reasons underlying
the separation of our republican form of government into the
thribe branches and also discussing previous constructions placed
upon it by the Kentucky Court of Appeals, as well as the decisiops of the courts of other states upon similar provisions.
"Primarily the power of selecting public officers rests with
the people they serve, but they may confide it in the Constitution they adopt, either expressly or by necessary implication, to
whatever department of the government they see proper, and the
question at last becomes one of the correct interpretation of the
particular Constitution involved." Quoting Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, 7th Ed., page 127, the court says, "Every
positive direction (in the Constitution) contains an implication
against anything contrary to it, or which would frustrate or disappoint the purpose of that provision," and page 99, "When
the Constitution defines the circuinstafices under which a right
may be exercised-the specification is an implied prohibition
against legislative interference to add to the condition." In
summing up the discussion, the court says: "From whatever

214
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angle the question is viewed we are carried back to the original
proposition that the legislative department shall enact or repeal
laws; the executive or administrative department shall enforce
them, and the judicial department shall pass upon their validity
and declare them; and that neither may encroach upon the functions of the other, unless otherwise provided in the Constitution
either expressly or by necessary implication, or where the exercised act is connected with and appertains to the functions of
the exercising department. It is unnecessary for the purposes
of this opinion for us to determine where or in what department
the power to elect or appoint the officer should be lodged by the
legislature, since in this case it attempted to lodge it nowhere,
but to exercise the right itself, which we hold it did not possess."

